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In this paper we voice concerns about the uncritical manner in which the mean is
often used as a summary statistic in psychological research. We identify a number of
implicit assumptions underlying the use of the mean and argue that the fragility of these
assumptions should be more carefully considered. We examine some of the ways in which
the potential violation of these assumptions can lead us into signiﬁcant theoretical and
methodological error. Illustrations of alternative models of research already extant within
Psychology are used to explore methods of research less mean-dependent and suggest
that a critical assessment of the assumptions underlying its use in research play a more
explicit role in the process of study design and review.
Keywords: mean, average, variability, noise, distributional analyses, cognition

INTRODUCTION
Psychology prides itself on its empirical basis. All undergraduate
psychology courses focus on training students in methods for collecting and analyzing data about human behavior. To this end, a
common introductory lesson in psychology involves measuring
a group of humans on some variable and calculating the mean
of the values. This mean value is then discussed as representing
the average performance of the group, as if this value provides a
representative substitute for the group’s data. It is our view that
rationalizing a set of data into one value is a theoretically loaded
practice that can be misleading and possibly erroneous. While the
mathematical tool itself is theory neutral, its use within the community of scientiﬁc practice within psychology is not. In this paper
we argue that the mean, used without care, can cause illusions of
stability and reliability in behavioral data, which in turn leads
to inappropriate conclusions regarding the underlying nature of
the psychological system. Our principal intent in what follows is
to make the assumptions inherent in typical scientiﬁc practices
more explicit, to expose them for critique. Our examination of
the mean is therefore less a statistical one than a theoretical one.
Having articulated these concerns we explore a number of related
alternative theoretical perspectives that are less reliant on those
explicated assumptions. We argue that, at the very least, we should
take more care in our use of the mean in analyzing data. Better
yet would be the adoption of methods and theoretical frameworks
that cope better with the complexity and variability of behavior
and cognition.
THE MEAN AND ITS USAGE
The most common form of the mean that is used in psychology is
the arithmetic mean. This represents the sum of all of the values
in a set divided by the number of values in the set. Although other
forms of the mean are used in psychology (e.g., geometric, harmonic), our arguments are mainly conﬁned here to the arithmetic
mean. Our concerns, though, are mainly with the use of measures
of central tendency, so our arguments apply in the general sense
to all forms of the mean.

Textbooks used in introductory psychology courses on statistics
and research methods typically refer to the mean as a measure
of central tendency and often contrast it to other measures of
central tendency such as the mode and the median. All such measures are used in situations where data sets contain some variation
(i.e., not every score has the same value). The aim in calculating one of these measures, then, is to generate a value that sits
somewhere in the middle of the distribution of scores. On the
relatively rare occasions that the particular importance of measures of central tendency is mentioned it is as an indicator of the
typical or most likely scores within the distribution (e.g., Haslam
and McGarty, 2003, p. 135; Dancey and Reidy, 2008, p. 44; Howitt
and Cramer, 2011, p. 25). These “typical” scores are “summary”
or “descriptive” statistics, providing at least some insight into the
basic characteristics of the distribution in question.
However, while all of the data in a distribution are involved in
calculation of the arithmetic mean, it remains a matter of judicious
use as to how well the mean represents those data. Summaries are
vital to good communication but used too frequently and uncritically they provide an impression of reliability or consistency that
distorts the normal state of affairs. It is this sometimes careless
overuse of the mean and its too frequent use without other statistics as a summary of distributions with which we are concerned
here. In particular, the over-reliance on the mean (despite the
fact that we all, of course, know better) expresses a way of thinking
about distributions and variability that we believe poses potentially
grave problems for our science. Introductory textbooks typically
indicate that most measures of anything related to humans, and
indeed any biological system, produce a distribution of scores.
These distributions are commonly normal in shape (although see
Micceri, 1989). That is, they have a shape that corresponds to
the Gaussian distribution, which has a symmetrical shape, with
most scores clustered around the middle of the distribution, fewer
scores at the tails, and a smooth transition from the middle to
the tails (see Figure 1). The mean, therefore, sits perfectly in the
middle of the normal distribution (as does the median and the
mode).
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Table 1 | Assumptions underlying the use of the mean in psychology
research.
1.There is a true value that we are trying to approximate when we measure
humans on some dimension.
2. Averaging helps us to eliminate the noise in our measures to see the
true value.
3. Any inability to use the mean as a reliable measure of a stable
characteristic is a product of weaknesses in methodology or calculation
(i.e., it does not represent a failure in the initial assumption that a true
value exists).
4. The noise in our measurements represents the effects of variables
unrelated to the one being measured.

FIGURE 1 | The Gaussian, or “normal,” distribution. X represents the
measured variable, and Y represents the probability of occurrence of
particular values of X.

The Gaussian distribution is also referred to as the “normal law
of error” (Boring, 1920), suggesting that scores on either side of
the mean represent some error of measurement. Adolph Quetelet,
the ﬁrst to apply this law to social and biological data, suggested
that the mean of a distribution of human measurements, such as
of a set of heights, represented nature’s ideal value and that values
on either side of the mean were deviations from nature’s ideal
(Howell, 2002)1 .
Relying on the mean of a set of scores to represent the set
appears to carry with it the assumption that the variation in values observed around the mean is somehow erroneous. Whether it
be that our methods of measurement are faulty, or that individual humans represent “deviations around nature’s ideal,” or both,
values around a mean are often considered noise, and the only
way to eliminate this noise is to average it away. What we are left
with, then, is an approximation to the “true” value for that human
dimension. It is this assumption regarding the interpretation of
noise, and the truth value of the mean, that we think requires
questioning. This assumption has several subsidiary assumptions
(see Table 1) that we tackle below. In the sections that follow we
review each of these assumptions and conclude that they are difﬁcult to justify. So too are some of the implications of using the
mean to infer features of the human cognitive system.
The uncritical or unreﬂective use of the mean in much psychological research makes us problematically blind to variation
and distribution amongst the data we collect. In focusing narrowly on the mean we make ourselves blind to potential variation
and complexity in our data and in the cognition and behavior
those data represent. The assumptions we identify as underlying
1 Other distributions are also observed with respect to measurements of human
characteristics, but these often reﬂect something peculiar to the characteristic under
scrutiny. For example, log-normal distributions are predominant in situations
involving some degree of competition or interaction between the elements being
measured (e.g., Halloy, 1998). Reaction time distributions (seen as ex-Gaussian
distributions) are invariably positively skewed, and this has inspired much model
development and testing (e.g., Ratcliff and McKoon, 2008; Holden et al., 2009;
Heathcote and Love, 2012).

the uncritical use of the mean are, effectively, assumptions about
certain characteristics of the psychological system, characteristics
that tell us more about the theoretical goggles we are wearing
than about the behavior we are observing. In later sections of the
paper we consider alternative approaches that help us shake these
assumptions, and suggest how these may provide fruitful means
of conducting research in psychology.

ASSUMPTION 1: THERE IS A TRUE VALUE THAT WE ARE
TRYING TO APPROXIMATE WHEN WE MEASURE HUMANS
ON SOME DIMENSION
What is it about human behavior we are trying to eliminate by
averaging? In our own ﬁeld of cognitive psychology it would seem
we assume that in each head there is a mechanism that is common
to all/most people, but which is obscured by our noisy measures
and/or our noisy heads. That is, in our experiments, we expose
a group of people to the same conditions. Everyone is assumed
to respond similarly to these conditions because their cognitive
mechanisms are similar. Unfortunately the data we collect from
these people are not identical, and we assume this is because
our measurements are not perfect and that there are a myriad
of tiny and random effects that conspire to create noise in the
data. Still, if we test a sufﬁciently large sample size, averaging
should enable us to observe the characteristics of each cognitive
mechanism unobscured by the noise.
The main question that occurs to us when we consider this
scenario is why do we assume that everyone has the same cognitive mechanism? Just as we would not readily accept that each
person’s height is some deviation from an ideal height, it is odd
that we would accept that each person’s brain works in exactly the
same manner. Certainly this is the assumption that our research
methods in cognitive psychology rest upon, and yet there does not
appear to be any attempt to justify it2 .
One means of justifying this assumption could be to point to
other systems in the human body and note that they all tend to
2 This is the strong version of the assumption. The weak version is that we assume
that people have pretty much the same cognitive mechanism. This, however, is
not a version that helps. If we accept that people have slightly varying cognitive
mechanisms, using the mean to draw inferences about these mechanisms – that is,
to get a picture of some average mechanism – we end up with a mechanism that
may not exist in anyone’s head. More on this later.
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work in similar ways in each individual. For example, the heart
operates in the same manner in each person and although some
viable deviations from the standard exist (e.g., atrial septal defect,
dextrocardia), the vast majority of people have similar cardiovascular systems. Most of the other major systems in the body
also have the same uniformity across the human species, from the
cellular to musculo-skeletal levels. In response to this justiﬁcation,
however, we would point to the fact that the brain has one major
difference to the other systems in the body – it changes its mode of
operation as a function of experience3 . We consider this response
further below, but for now we suggest that the assumption of
common cognitive mechanisms is one that can be challenged, and
probably should not be the starting point in explaining human
behavior.

ASSUMPTION 2: AVERAGING HELPS US TO ELIMINATE THE
NOISE IN OUR MEASURES TO SEE THE TRUE VALUE
We have no issue with the common statistical notion of sampling
error. This is the notion that, when sampling from a population
of scores, each sample will have a mean that is likely to vary from
the mean of the population with a fairly predictable probability.
That is, there are likely to be many samples with means that fall
fairly close to the population mean, and a much smaller number
that have means further away from the population mean. The
chances of obtaining a sample mean close to the population mean
are increased by taking a larger sample.
The problem we have with sampling is more in the interpretation of sampling error. Just as we have a difﬁculty with the concept
of the mean reﬂecting a true value on some variable, we also ﬁnd
it challenging to accept that sample values on either side of the
mean reﬂect noise in the data. This interpretation suggests that
these values are not psychologically meaningful. Instead they are a
nuisance factor that requires elimination. Indeed, if this noise did
not exist, if we could measure “true” values directly, we would have
no need for inferential statistics such as the analysis of variance
(ANOVA).
Despite there being something of a tradition within psychology pointing out the difﬁculty in this assumption (see particularly
recent consideration by Doherty et al., 2013, and more classically, Meehl, 1978), standard practice would appear to hold tight
to this assumption. Just as there are no obvious justiﬁcations
for the argument that the mean reﬂects some true value, we
have discovered no explicit attempts to justify the elimination
of variance as a “cleaning-up” activity. It just appears to be the
done thing.
A crucial mathematical (as opposed to psychological/theoretical) assumption regarding the use of the average to
eliminate noise is the shape of the distribution in question. For the
assumed Gaussian curve averaging provides us with a clear representation of the center of the distribution, the “noise” to either side
being averaged away. In a sobering and landmark paper, Micceri
(1989) noted that normal curves are very rare in real psychological
3 Other systems in the body do this also (e.g., the cardio-vascular system responds
to regular exercise by becoming more efﬁcient), but this is usually in a quantitative
manner, whereas the brain alters its functioning in not only a quantitative, but also
a qualitative manner (Patel et al., 2013).

data. To calculate the mean in the hope of eliminating noise or getting some glimpse of a “true” or even a typical value hidden in the
variation is simply to overlook reality in favor of a comfortingly
elegant mathematical ideal.

ASSUMPTION 3: ANY INABILITY TO USE THE MEAN AS A
RELIABLE MEASURE OF A STABLE CHARACTERISTIC IS A
PRODUCT OF WEAKNESSES IN METHODOLOGY OR
CALCULATION (i.e., IT DOES NOT REPRESENT A FAILURE IN
THE INITIAL ASSUMPTION THAT A TRUE VALUE EXISTS)
One of the assumptions underlying averaging is that our methodologies are inherently faulty in that they cannot be expected to
provide perfect measures of the variables of interest. To some
extent, this assumption is indisputable, considering that even measurements of physical properties (e.g., length, temperature) carry
with them conventional measurement error values. In psychology,
however, we take this assumption further than in the physical sciences. Although we accept that there are features of the physical
environment that will affect the accuracy of any measurements we
take, we are also concerned with the validity and the reliability
of the measures. Validity reﬂects whether we are measuring what
we think we are measuring. Most often psychological variables are
not directly observable so we need to construct measures that are
directly observable and argue that these reﬂect the operation of the
unobservable mechanisms we are interested in. Even if we assume
that our measures are valid in this sense, the reliability of these
measures concerns psychology greatly. Indeed, Psychological Test
Theory makes explicit this notion by indicating that each score on
a particular test reﬂects the true value for that person on the test,
plus error (Novick, 1966). In cognitive psychology, we do not seem
to believe that our measures are capable of producing an accurate
reﬂection of the state of a person’s cognitive system at some point
in time. Indeed, if we exposed a person to the same stimuli, under
the same conditions, on several occasions, and recorded their reaction times in responding to those stimuli, we would likely average
the individual reaction times, on the assumption that each RT
could not reﬂect the “true” RT for that person in that condition.
There is little doubt that there would be variance amongst the
RT values recorded in this situation but what is the justiﬁcation
for assuming that each RT is a deviant of the true value? Instead of
assuming that each RT is the true value plus some error created by
seemingly random processes, could it not be possible that each RT
reﬂects the state of the cognitive system as it is at that point in time?
By this we mean, behavior in response to the experimental conditions reﬂects not only the external conditions, but also the state of
the cognitive system as the behavior is occurring. The system will
be in a different state to the one it was in on the previous occasion
when an RT was recorded, and to the state when the next RT is
recorded, if for no other reason than the fact that the system has
experienced a repetition of the experimental conditions and made
the same responses. The assumption then that taking the average
of measures from repeated trials will provide a reﬂection of some
stable element of the cognitive system seems fanciful given that the
system could not be stable if we keep giving it experiences. This is a
psychological reﬂection of the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle –
by measuring a system, we are inﬂuencing the system and hence
affecting the very thing we are trying to measure. Unfortunately,
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averaging several scores will not result in a value that reﬂects some
stable feature of the cognitive system. Instead, this stable feature
may not even exist.

ASSUMPTION 4: THE NOISE IN OUR MEASUREMENTS
REPRESENTS THE EFFECTS OF VARIABLES UNRELATED TO
THE ONE BEING MEASURED
Part of the justiﬁcation for averaging scores appears to be the
assumption that scores on either side of the mean reﬂect error.
This error can be error of measurement, as considered above, but it
can also reﬂect the operation of many factors that inﬂuence behavior. There is recognition in psychology that humans are sensitive
to a vast range of variables, and any measurement of one variable
is going to show the effects of many of these other variables too
(hence the widespread usage in psychology of statistical methods
such as Factor Analysis and Structural Equation Modeling). However, we assume that these effects have several characteristics. One
is that they are random, and the other is that they operate independently of the variable we are interested in (i.e., the one we are
currently measuring). Essentially, then, this error is assumed to
be analogous to white noise in a radio signal. As such, calculating
the mean is assumed to be just like ﬁne tuning a radio signal – in
both situations, noise is eliminated to enable a clearer perception
of the signal. Again, though, we wonder what justiﬁcation there is
for such an assumption. Below we consider whether it is appropriate to assume that the variance in a set of scores is a reﬂection
of variables that are random and independent of the variable we
have measured.
INTERPRETIVE CONSEQUENCES OF USING THE MEAN
The mean is often used as if it is a good representation of a group
of scores. Clearly it is only used when there is variation amongst
scores – if there is no variation, then the scores can be characterized
easily as so many scores of the same value. When there is variation
amongst the scores, some measure that reﬂects the middle of the
distribution of scores is considered to be a good reﬂection of the
type of score that is observed in that set. As this variation in the
set increases, however, the conﬁdence one has in the mean being a
good reﬂection of the group decreases.
This raises an issue with respect to the testing of differences
between groups in an experimental design. Standard inferential
statistics compare the variation between groups with the variation
within groups in order to determine whether the scores in one
group are signiﬁcantly different to those in the other group. In
spite of its name, then, ANOVA is rarely used to determine whether
differences exist between the variances of two or more samples.
Although there is explicit recognition that it is variance we are
considering, ultimately the conclusions that are drawn in such
situations concern whether the mean of one group is different to
the mean of the other group. So, even though the statistical test
explicitly considers the degree of overlap between the distributions
of scores in the groups, the ﬁnal conclusion is phrased in terms of
whether one mean is signiﬁcantly larger than the other.
The extent to which such a conclusion is a fair reﬂection of
the state of the distributions is of course affected by the size of
the difference between the means but it is also inﬂuenced by the
amount of variation in the distributions, and the number of scores

in each distribution. Thus it is not uncommon to see signiﬁcant
differences between means reported where the differences are very
small. This will happen when the variation within groups of scores
is small, and/or the number of scores is large (Cumming, 2012,
chapter 12).
In the end, though, a conclusion that the mean of one group
is different to the mean of another group can end up being translated as one condition improved performance more than another
condition, or similar. But is this an accurate summation of the
outcome of the statistical test, and for what purposes are such
conclusions used? When one concludes that one condition led
to better performance than another condition, at best the implicit
conclusion is that, on average, or generally, this condition improves
performance. But, as is clear from the above characterization of
inferential statistics, there may well be signiﬁcant overlap in the
scores between the two conditions. For instance, if Condition A led
to better overall performance than Condition B, there could well
be scores in Condition B that were better than scores in Condition
A. In other words, the ﬁnal conclusion may represent an accurate description of the state of affairs for a subset of scores, but
not necessarily for the whole set. Many undergraduate statistical
courses and textbooks include such caveats in the discussion of the
outcome of statistical tests, but the practices of scientists and standards of review and publication in journals involve few checks or
balances against this kind of concern (see Marmolejo-Ramos and
Matsunaga, 2009 for examples and explorations of good practice
in this regard).
Inferential statistical tests generally do not provide information
regarding the number of cases that do or do not match the pattern
of results represented by the difference in means4 . It is, of course, a
trivial matter to generate such information. Doing so can provide
illuminating results.
For example, one of us teaches a unit in Cognition in which
one laboratory exercise involves replicating the Word Superiority Effect. This is where detection of a letter is found to be more
accurate when the letter is presented in the context of a word
than when presented in isolation (Reicher, 1969; Wheeler, 1970).
Data has been collected in this laboratory exercise for over 5 years.
Although the standard word superiority result is found with these
data and supported by a statistically signiﬁcant superiority in the
word condition, when individual scores are considered, almost
half of the over 500 people in the experiment provided results that
either showed no difference between the conditions (i.e., identical
accuracy scores in each condition), or showed results that were the
opposite of the effect. Although there may well be methodological differences between our experiment and the classic versions
published by Reicher and Wheeler, this observation does raise
a serious question over the validity of using inferential statistics
to assess differences between means. If we just examine the differences between means and focus only on whether or not this
difference is statistically signiﬁcant, we can end up with a conclusion that describes the effect of the manipulation as if it has had
the effect on all or most of the individual scores in the data set.
In other words, the mean difference can ultimately represent all
4 See Cohen (1977) for a measure (U3) that estimates such group differences post
hoc.
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Table 2 | Number (%) of empirical articles in Memory & Cognition
(2012) and Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory,
and Cognition (2012) classified according to main analysis type.
Journal

X̄ /NHST

Ind. Diffs

Other

Total

M&C

88 (82.2%)

17 (15.9%)

2 (1.9%)

107

JEP: LMC

79 (81.44%)

6 (6.19%)

12 (12.37%)

97

X̄ /NHST, summary statistics (e.g., mean, frequencies) and null hypothesis significance testing; Ind. Diffs, analysis explored individual differences in responses;
Other, analysis could not be classiﬁed into one of the other two categories (e.g.,
structural equation modeling, chi-squared, Bayesian analyses of various kinds,
regression or mediational analyses).

of the differences, whereas in many situations this may well be
inaccurate. To the credit of Reicher and Wheeler, in addition to
reporting inferential statistics related to the differences between
means, they did also examine the number of people that showed
the effect compared to those that did not. Indeed, in their experiments, the proportion was far higher than in ours. The point
remains, however, that without investigating the data beyond the
means, one’s conﬁdence that the means reﬂect the overall results
should be low (e.g., Balota and Yap, 2011).
One heavy-handed solution to this problem would be to conﬁne our theorizing to situations where the differences between
conditions are so clear that there is no need for inferential statistics to determine whether or not differences are signiﬁcant. An
example of such a clear difference between conditions would be
where 80% of participants in one condition show results that are
higher/larger/better/faster than 80% of participants in another
group. This would be a difference in performance that would be
obvious, has a good chance of being replicated, and everyone
would believe. Conﬁning ourselves to effects that are this obvious
would limit the number of phenomena that require explanation,
and may reduce the current preponderance of seemingly unrelated
phenomena and theories5 . Although the shortcomings of inferential statistics have been discussed at great length elsewhere, and for
some time now (Cohen, 1990, 1994; Hammond, 1996), it would
appear that the message is not getting through. Indeed, when we
asked some of our colleagues to read early drafts of this paper, a
common response was along the lines “everyone knows this stuff.”
And yet we see little evidence of a change in behavior. An illustrative survey of the analysis methods used in research reported in
2012 in two prominent cognitive psychology journals is presented
in Table 2. Perhaps the “everyone knows this stuff ” response is a
form of the hindsight bias (Hawkins and Hastie, 1990).
An illustration of how problematic averaged data can be comes
from Heathcote et al. (2000). The target of their investigation was
5 Other solutions have been proposed before. One is to report effect sizes along with
the results of signiﬁcance testing (Cohen, 1994). This does not, however, address
the issues we have identiﬁed because effect sizes are mostly used in comparisons
of means. In this context the effect size is just a way of characterizing how large
the difference is between the means, in relation to the variance observed. Another
solution is to report conﬁdence intervals with means (Cumming and Finch, 2005).
Again this does not entirely solve the problem because a conﬁdence interval is
just a measure of average variance, and so glosses over details of a distribution of
scores. Balota and Yap (2011) demonstrate that several parameters describing RT
distributions can be psychologically meaningful.

FIGURE 2 | Mean RT data from practice on an arithmetic task.
Participants (N = 40) solved an equation [(x 2 − y )/2 = A) with eight
repeating (x,y ) pairs, determining whether A was “odd” or “even” for each
pair, for 40 blocks of eight trials.

the Power Law of Learning. This refers to the observation that
improvement in the speed of performing a task with practice has
a characteristic pattern: performance improves by large amounts
early in practice but these increments in performance get smaller
as practice proceeds. The smooth trend in these learning curves
can more often than not be described well by a power function (see
Figure 2). Such curves have been observed in ﬁelds as disparate
as cigar rolling (Crossman, 1959), reading mirror-reversed text
(Kolers, 1976) and implicit memory (Kirsner and Speelman, 1996),
and are similar to retention and forgetting curves in memory
(Ebbinghaus, 1885). So ubiquitous is this observation that it has
been said to comprise one of the few laws in psychology (Newell
and Rosenbloom, 1981), and the one fact that requires explanation
by any credible theory of skill acquisition (Anderson, 1982; Logan,
1988). Heathcote et al. (2000) however, called into question the
lawfulness of this relationship between performance speed and
practice. They demonstrated that power functions result from
averaging any group data with a downward trend. The important point here is that power functions can appear in averaged
data, even when they do not occur in individual data. Certainly
if individual data is inspected, smooth learning curves are rarely
observed. Although performance usually gets faster with practice
on a task, performance from trial to trial almost never follows a
smooth downward trend (see Figure 3).
So, why should theories attempt to explain power function
learning if it does not actually exist in individual performance?
The assumption of many cognitive theorists appears to be that
individual performance does not reﬂect the real behavior they
wish to explain, and that averaging is required over many trials
and many people to remove the noise from the data in order for
the real pattern to emerge. In the case of the Power Law of Learning, it appears that skill acquisition theorists assume that learning
is smooth, and follows a power function, and therefore their
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FIGURE 3 | An individual’s RT as a function of practice for specific
items in the arithmetic task of Figure 2.

theories must posit a learning mechanism that produces power
function learning curves. It is possible, though, that this assumption is misguided. Rather than assuming that learning must follow
a smooth trajectory, and so average data must be used to observe
this smoothness, why not accept that the noise in data is an accurate reﬂection of the cognitive processes underlying performance?
One theory of skill acquisition (Speelman and Kirsner, 2005) does
take this position and considers noise in the data as the outcome of
competition between cognitive processes striving to control performance. The lesson for all theories of cognitive processes, then,
is that proposing mechanisms to explain mean performance may
provide explanations of behavior that does not exist.
ILLUSTRATING THE PROBLEM IN BRAIN IMAGING RESEARCH

Psychology has recently faced a number of controversies that have
caused us to take stock of our assumptions and practices as a
discipline (e.g., Ritchie et al., 2012 and Roediger, 2012 on replication; Simonsohn, 2012 and Vogel, 2011 on data fraud). Little
about the implications of these controversies is really new (Bakan,
1966; Meehl, 1978; Rosenthal, 1979; Cohen, 1994; Kirk, 1996;
Rosenthal, 1966) though because of the relatively recent development and excitement of brain imaging research scrutiny in that
domain is a particularly burgeoning ﬁeld (Uttal, 2001; Vul et al.,
2009; Carp, 2012), where sources of apparent stability or reliability in a behavior, effect or cognitive process are being increasingly
questioned. While there are a number of different statistical and
methodological bases for the various concerns raised by critics,
the assumption of stability of function and consistency of operation across individuals that averages suggest so strongly is one that
has not been carefully considered in much of the localization of
function neuroscience literature.
Brain imaging research tends to produce colorful pictures of
the brain with speciﬁc areas highlighted by bright colors to signify
areas of high neural activity, typically associated with cognitive
functioning of a particular type. Such pictures, however, are only

generated through a process of combining activity patterns across
many trials and many people. Data collected from an MRI machine
are very noisy. Or at least, that is one interpretation. Another interpretation is that MRI machines produce an incredible amount of
data. At any one moment in time the activity of neurons across
the whole brain is inferred from the measurement of blood ﬂow.
If someone looking at a picture of the activity pattern hopes to
see something easily interpretable, it is not surprising that the initial impression is that of a noisy and possibly random assortment
of activations of varying degrees. However, if one assumes that
hidden amongst the noise are areas of high activation where speciﬁc forms of cognitive processing are occurring, then one might
consider looking for such areas by trying to eliminate the noise.
Much of the noise comes from systematic sources such as the MRI
machine and participant movement and so can be easily compensated for. Other noise, however, is seemingly random neural noise.
Despite the impression provided by functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) pictures, when areas of the brain are highly
active, the other areas of the brain are not quiet. Determining
the signal from the noise, then, becomes an important consideration when analyzing the activation patterns. Several methods are
used to “clean up” the signal. One involves exposing individuals
to many trials involving the same stimuli and requiring the same
responses. The activation patterns from similar trials are then combined through averaging. This method assumes that the activation
associated with particular stimuli and responses is similar each
time. Another clean up method involves combining the average
activation patterns from several individuals. One of the problems
associated with this averaging step is that there are considerable
individual differences in skull proportion. To combine patterns
from different heads requires mathematically correcting each skull
so that it matches the dimensions of a standard skull. This then
ensures that activation patterns are combined from corresponding
brain areas.
All of the averaging and correction involved in the analysis of
fMRI activation patterns is concerning given our arguments about
the mean. In particular we are concerned that fMRI researchers
have designed their analytical tools to match their assumptions
regarding what they will ﬁnd in the data. Unfortunately, insufﬁcient critical attention to these assumptions could mean that
alternate hypotheses are ignored. For instance, when researchers
combine fMRI activation patterns from many people, they assume
that brain structures are similar across people, and they are responsible for similar functions in all people. Although we have no
argument with the proposition that human brains share the same
gross anatomy, we wonder about the assumption that speciﬁc
localized areas within the cortex are responsible for speciﬁc cognitive functions. Some areas of the cortex have undeniable links
with certain functions (e.g., the occipital lobe plays a major role
in vision), but within certain areas, researchers often try to make
the distinctions between an area that could be responsible for cognitive function X, whereas function Y is controlled by a different
area (examples abound, see Gläscher et al., 2012 for a recent one).
Further, we will get a stronger demonstration of this if we combine
the activation patterns of many people, the more the better for the
sake of statistical power. The problem with this strategy is that
alternative hypotheses – that function is not localized, or that it is,
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but is localized differently for each person – are ruled out by the
methodology. The activation patterns that result from averaging
over many trials and many people may not actually reﬂect what
goes on in any one person’s head. It may only be a reﬂection of
what we would see if we undertake a lot of averaging. In other
words, the activation pattern may not really exist except as some
epiphenomenon of the methodology. This then raises a further
problem – how can we make sense of group data when considering the case of an individual. Are we able to generalize a picture that
has been derived from many data points to one data point? There
are clear practical implications in cases involving brain damage
and surgery.
Brain imaging research has over the past decade begun to move
away from simple localization research, and signiﬁcant developments have occurred in areas such as single-trial analyses (for a
useful and brief map of that literature see Pernet et al., 2011).
Indeed a recent study (Dinstein et al., 2012) that compared brain
images from autistic adults and control subjects demonstrates how
averaging brain images across trials and individuals can reveal a
story quite different to the one that emerges from a focus on individual trial data. Others (Zilles and Amunts, 2013) have explicitly
suggested that variability between subjects is not noise but important information. Reviewing neuroimaging work by Mueller et al.
(2013) Zilles and Amunts examine a range of ways in which
group-based analyses of neuronal structure can lead us to overlook
information about individual differences in neuronal structure
and change in structure over time that offers crucial clues to the
processes underlying brain development. In particular, the use
of group means allows different levels of individual variability
to affect the sensitivity of methods used to ﬁnd differences in
brain regions (low variable regions will show small effects more
noticeably).
While the logic of averaging is clearly problematic in the case
of brain imaging research, and is under current active scrutiny,
this issue nevertheless remains problematic for other areas of
psychology too.

DOES THE MEAN UNCOVER OR IMPOSE UNIVERSALITY?
REFLECTING FINDINGS IN PSYCHOLOGY UPON OUR OWN
PRACTICES
The mean, like any piece of technology, is a tool. In itself it is
impassive. Any use of a tool, however, is conducted on the basis of
standards within a community of practice. While the mean itself
is not laden with any particular theoretical assumptions our use of
the mean is, and these assumptions are not without consequence.
Our purpose in the present paper is to encourage researchers
to more frequently reﬂect on the fact that in focusing on the
mean, in following a tendency to collapse things and encapsulate things into averages, we ﬁlter out individual differences and
impose universality rather than ﬁnding it.
Molden and Dweck (2006) explore some of the ways in which
a person’s understanding or interpretation of a situation or phenomenon can have a dramatic effect on their behavior. Whether
a person takes intelligence as a ﬁxed capacity (what they term
an “entity view”), for instance, or as something that can change
or develop over time (an “incremental view”) impacts on how a
person performs in learning situations and how they respond to

challenges or feedback. It would appear that individual differences
in the meaningfulness of the situation can, sometimes dramatically, inﬂuence what a person does or what they are capable
of, undermining any easy predictions based on what we might
understand to be the “typical” cognitive system underlying such
performance.
Summarizing several strands of such work, Molden and Dweck
(2006) argue that while it is important for psychology to search for
universals in behavior and cognition, these universals should be
carefully described at the right level of abstraction. Our descriptions of the human psyche, when done in general or universal
terms, potentially obscures the ways in which cognition, attitudes,
values and behavior vary between people and between contexts.
This potentially limits our science in two important ways6 .
Firstly, by obscuring variation it biases our perceptions of the
phenomena we study, making them appear more stable and determinate than may well be the case. Ironically, research in social
psychology has warned us of such biases in human perception for
decades. It is termed the fundamental attribution error (Jones and
Harris, 1967; Ross, 1977), or correspondence bias, and is a notoriously difﬁcult habit to break. Put simply, when we see another
person act in a particular way we tend to see the behavior as dispositionally driven, rather than context-dependent. We are more
likely to view the behavior as a stable characteristic of the individual rather than as a response to the speciﬁc vagaries of the
circumstances in which the behavior occurs. To criticize much
psychological research as falling prey to the fundamental attribution error would of course be glib and inaccurate but as a notion
that is both provocative and evocative it is a useful tool with which
to illustrate the problems of overlooking or downplaying variation in people’s behavior or cognitive activity and summarizing
outcomes with means alone. We rightly take pride in our use of
objective tools in the conduct of our research and analysis but our
exuberance for method can lead us to overlook the embedding of
these tools in less objective assumptions and standards of practice
that need periodic review. It is easy for us to make claims such as
“the data show. . .” when the data can of course be used to support
a number of different possible stories, once we have tamed it with
data-cleaning techniques and stabilized the outcome with a single
summary ﬁgure – the average.
The second way in which our science is limited by an overdependence on the mean as summary is in the generalization
of results. The frequent use of the average as the sole description of a group’s performance on a task, or measurement on a
trait, characteristic or outcome, greatly limits our understanding
of individual cases. It is well known that we cannot predict the
individual case from statistics but where our discussions of measurements are presented almost exclusively in terms of averages
we constrain ourselves to describing and discussing groups alone.
It may be argued, reasonably, that decades of measurements have
6 Molden and Dweck and other’s research noted here uses mean group differences
in precisely the way we are criticizing. The point is not that such research is not to
be done, or is somehow valueless (far from it) but it must be interpreted and used
judiciously, and we should look to what is possible given such conclusions rather
than what is somehow essential. In the present case, we should be conservative
about our use of certain statistical tools precisely because it is quite possible that it
will negatively affect our science, as discussed further in the text.
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shown that human beings are so variable in their responses as to
make conﬁdent predictions of individual’s actions to be foolhardy.
There are so many variables, often interacting in non-linear ways,
that generalization to the individual simply cannot be a reasonable
aim of the discipline.
It is certainly the case that researchers routinely report variability measures (e.g., standard deviations, standard errors, conﬁdence
intervals) along with means. Despite this widespread reporting,
however, one can question whether researchers are utilizing this
information to temper their conclusions that are based upon the
means. These measures generally provide information about the
size of an underlying distribution but little information about
its shape. Given the overwhelming focus upon mean scores, we
wonder if the reporting of variability measures is merely an
afterthought, or just fulﬁlling an expectation of journal reviewers
and editors. More obviously, the reporting of sample variability
measures completely overlooks the variability inherent in individual participants’ responses – information regarding this variability
is eliminated by using subject means to reﬂect each person’s
performance.
Nonetheless, examining ranges of scores and variability as phenomena of interest in and of themselves would provide us with a
context within which to frame individual observations, the better to understand what the possibilities are such that we can
then make a more informed decision about what the probabilities might be in the individual case. Rather than seeing outliers as
unclean, aberrations or errors that should be excised before the
real work begins, they provide us with information on what is
possible. Rather than trying to prophecy single speciﬁc outcomes,
which would likely be unsuccessful, a describing of the landscape
of possibilities would provide useful insight in many behavioral
contexts.
Context effects are ubiquitous in all areas of psychological
research. Our habit of describing things in terms of means rather
than ranges and distributions tends to reduce analysis of this fact
into a list of independent observations, a shopping list of possibilities with little to relate the differences in cognitive function from
one situation to the next. The very term “context” is frustratingly
difﬁcult to deﬁne, and varies in use from experiment to experiment, researcher to researcher, a lack of discipline that isolates the
work of different individuals and thus obscures what relationships
exist between the various independent observations, making it
difﬁcult if not impossible to overcome the “shopping list” state of
our current understanding. (It is left as an exercise for the reader
to review what the “context effects” are in their own domain of
interest and to examine just what is being considered as “context,”
and the criteria on which that decision is based.)
We would argue that the unguarded use of the mean to
summarize outcomes from different experiments suppresses the
perception of both variability and continuity between results,
tempting us to see the differences as more stable and certain than
they really are, and leading to the balkanisation of research that
limits our insights into psychological functioning. In this, we suggest that the mode of analysis and description inherent in the
use of the mean as principal summary statistic is very similar to
that of the cognitive linguistic phenomenon of nominalization as
described by Barsalou et al. (2010), p. 350,

...it is possible to conceptualize nouns in decontextualized ways, and
these decontextualizations play important roles. We err, however, when
we mistakenly believe that these decontextualized mechanisms refer to
meaningful entities in isolation, and forget that they operate intrinsically
in contexts and depend on contexts for their realization. The mechanism
indexed by a noun integrates a large system of situated patterns, with this
system usually producing an emergent form well-suited to the current
situation.

Similarly, the behavior or cognitive activity indexed by a mean
of measured performance is a collection of context-sensitive processes that likely include much more than the speciﬁc independent
variable with which that mean is explicitly associated in a given
study. Though it is inherent in psychological training that we be
critical and circumspect in our assessment of reported results, we
are not immune to the biases that we report in our participants’
behavior.
In no sense do we suggest that the mean is somehow wrong.
The problem is rather that it is so satisfying. Decades of research
on attribution biases and Barsalou et al.’s (2010) work on nominalization suggests that the kind of encapsulated and stable idea of
performance that the mean suggests is an enticing, seductive view
(at least for the Western majority involved in high “impact” psychological research). The basic aims of research, insofar as it entails
a search for the general and the universal ﬁll our perceptions and
interpretations of data and settle standards of practice that lean
heavily toward the stable, reliable and consistent. We thus suggest
that the problematically uncritical use of the mean is an expression of an unreﬂectively held view of the psychological system.
Re-consideration of our statistical tools will also involve some reconsideration of our theoretical standpoint and the standard ways
in which we formulate research questions.
Though there are certainly domains and approaches within
psychology that emphasize contextualized performance and situational variability (see for instance Barrett et al., 2010 for a survey
of recent cognitive work; see also the much discussed situational
view of personality by Mischel and Shoda, 1995; Mischel, 2004),
the search for general capacities and universal functions is by far
the more common.

SUPPRESSING THE ASSUMPTION OF STABILITY
There are alternatives to thinking about psychological mechanisms as shared and stable characteristics of the human species
that do not lead us into despair or pessimism about the possibility of a uniﬁed and systematic theory of psychology. The
development, over the past two decades, of modes of thinking
that place great emphasis on individual developmental dynamics,
the (often messy) details of a cognitive agent’s actual, real, bodily
interaction with its environment, provide us with an approach that
allows for more nuanced, dynamic perspectives on psychology and
psychological processes.
There are a number of these different ways of thinking. They
are not necessarily commensurable with one another and as yet do
not offer a single coherent vision of psychology that might be recognizable as a “paradigm” in the Kuhnian sense, to which we could
leap in some revolutionary fervor. However, what these different
approaches make clear, having been developing around the fringes
of the discipline for decades and gradually encroaching further
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into mainstream research, is that valuable, fruitful research can be
done in which the emphasis is placed on the dynamics of change in
psychological processes over time, and in which the complexity of
interactions between the individual characteristics of both the person and the environment in which they are acting can be accounted
for and incorporated into scientiﬁc psychological theory. Such
approaches do not suppress variation in the behaviors of people
but rather see it as a rich resource for understanding how psychology interacts with context. Similarly, while these approaches use a
variety of statistical tools other than the standard signiﬁcance testing that remains the mainstream, the arithmetic mean is still used,
but its use does not require the assumptions of underlying “true”
values clothed in noise with which we take issue in this paper.
The developmental dynamics of Thelen and Smith (1994) are
a perfect example of this focus on processes and change over
rigid structure. Thelen and Smith examine development as a
contextualized process of interplay between the child and their
environment, providing evidence for the growth of motor skills
not as the blossoming of standard, universal cognitive capacities
(true values to be approximated with averaged observations) but
as the coping of the individual child with the demands of their
idiosyncratic histories. The differences between children in their
development has at least as much to tell us about how development
occurs than the similarities.
The idea that the cognitive system is not rigidly speciﬁed, but is
in fact supple and responsive (over a number of timescales) to the
quirks, speciﬁcs and details of the environment in which it operates
is summed up by Clark’s (1997) description of the “soft assembly”
of cognitive function. Rigidly or “hard assembled” systems have a
ﬁxed structure and mode of operation. There is a “right” way to
describe how the different components of the system relate to one
another, an ideal of the system that is, in some fundamental way,
correct. Not so for soft assembled systems.
Soft assembled systems tend to have loosely inter-connected
components, less ﬁxed positions within a structure so much as a
pool of potential resources that can be organized within various
constraints in response to situations and task demands. There is
no ideal of how such a system should be organized, no schematic
that can be drawn that captures the correct way in which the
components might relate to one another, as these things will
vary continuously depending on contexts, individual histories and
immediate requirements. Soft assembled systems tend not to use
central controllers but rather they self-organize, with task-speciﬁc
activity emerging from the dynamic interaction between components and environment. This can happen either over quite brief
timescales, or more slowly over longer periods.
The net result, if cognitive activity is assembled in such a manner, is that similar behavior might in fact be the result of quite
differently organized psychological processes. There is no “correct”
mapping of the psychological system, no signal about cognitive
structure being hidden by the noise of individual variation. Such
a theoretical standpoint eschews assumptions of single true values
to be sought in the noise of individual variation and measurement error. What must be understood is the dynamics of response
to situations over time, with an appreciation that different individual histories will often result in quite differently arranged but
similarly performing psychological systems. What is more, it may

be the case that even within a single individual over particular
timescales (those associated with learning in its many forms) we
might see the structure and functioning of the cognitive system
changing dramatically.

UNDERSTANDING SIMILARITY AND STABILITY IN
BEHAVIORAL PERFORMANCE
The idea of a stable and shared set of basic cognitive processes
underlying some of our use of the mean is not entirely an assumption. It is rooted in the success of our everyday interactions, the
ease with which we can coordinate with one another, share experiences and activities. A critical reader would no doubt at this point
be arguing that the statistical tests we typically use in data analysis invariably take the variance or deviations within the sample
into account, while also emphasizing the plain fact that while it
might be true that everyone is unique, it is plainly true that we
share a great deal. People vary, sure, but looking around, they do
not vary nearly as much as they could in most cases, and most of
what differences do exist seem to be quite subtle – certainly nothing requiring any fundamental re-think of our use of statistics or
theoretical perspective.
Amongst these new approaches to psychological research, how
is this simple truth about the similarity of human beings to be
captured and explained?
There are certainly some things that human beings generally
share (though there are very few that are genuinely universal).
Our basic body plan, our nutritional requirements, the range of
physical stimuli to which we are sensitive and with which we can
interact, these tend to vary within fairly narrow ranges. These
shared constraints on our behavior will provide particular channels for developmental change, channels that will be structured
further by the cultural provision of particular developmental tasks
and demands. Each human being follows a unique developmental trajectory but there are constraints on that trajectory. A key
observation here, however, is that this more developmental mode
of explanation suggests that the reason for people’s similarities is
not the inexorable unfolding of a pre-speciﬁed and consistently
presenting cognitive system, but the shared constraints on development, which may specify the ends (consistency in behavior), but
will typically underspecify the means.
The developmental work of Thelen and Smith (1994) once
again offers us some examples. Their much cited work examining the development of reaching and grasping in two infants,
Hannah and Gabriel, describes how features of the children’s bodies, their intrinsic dynamics, idiosyncrasies of energetics or even
simply mass, mean that each child has a different developmental
task in order to achieve the same outcome. Whereas the excitable
Gabriel must learn to draw energy out of the whole reaching system and slow his movements down if he is to manage to get his
hand successfully to a target object, the more placid Hannah must
learn to put more oomph and effort in to achieve the same result.
Karmiloff-Smith (2000) describes similar differences, this time
not in order to explain individual differences but rather to explain
the response to different developmental constraints in the performance of the “standard” function of face recognition for people
with or without Williams syndrome (WS). She argues that similarly proﬁcient behavior of people with or without WS in the
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overall task of face recognition is underpinned by quite variant
collections of more basic cognitive skills (e.g., recognizing facial
identity, facial emotion, eye-gaze direction, or lip-reading). That
is, the same behavioral outcome can be the result of quite different forms of underlying process. This is a clear case where one
researcher’s noise is another researcher’s signal.
Typically as researchers it is precisely those choices and manipulations of the environment that will ensure the highest probability
of similar performance are those most highly valued in experimental settings. In most of our research we take great pains
to limit the range of participants’ behaviors in order to make
consistency and similarity the most likely outcome. Gross variability, or indeed any variability not directly attributable to the
chosen independent variable is considered a sign of a poorly
designed study – other potential sources of change and difference
are suppressed. There are certainly times when this is desirable.
We suggest, however, that such practices have been adopted as
standard and implemented by many researchers without due consideration of their valid range of application. Recently developing
theoretical perspectives within the dynamical family of viewpoints push explicit reﬂection on these questions to the fore
once again. We consider this a very positive development, one
which will not suppress the use of the mean in our research, but
will hopefully suppress its use in an uncritical, or overly focused
manner.

CONCLUSION
Our point in raising these issues is not to suggest that psychology
wean itself off use of the mean, or to go cold turkey on averages. Such inane recommendations would deserve the disdain with
which they would inevitably be met. However, we do argue for a
more careful, critical and explicit use of averages in the discussion of measurements and the reporting of results. Speciﬁcally, we
argue that the mean must not be used without reﬂection on the
theoretical assumptions and frameworks that are underlying its
use and we suggest that in the typical case a theoretical perspective closer to that of dynamical systems will be more appropriate,
providing more context and a fuller picture of the behavior in
question from the data observed.
The average provides us with important and useful information
but we see its use in summarizing and analyzing groups to suppress important individual differences in behavioral and cognitive
performance as having become unbalanced. The range and variance of scores in distributions should be reported as frequently
and clearly as averages and should temper our easy acceptance
of the mean as representative of the numerous individual people whose behavior or characteristics are being recorded. Tukey
(1977) pioneered graphical techniques for presenting such information. An excellent recent example is provided by Doherty et al.
(2013), whose Figure 4 presents the means from a one-way ANOVA
design, along with all of the data that featured in the analysis.
This ﬁgure not only depicts the relationship between the independent variable and means on the dependent variable, but it
also reveals the extent to which the relationship exists amongst
the individual observations, and represents the overlap between
conditions more completely than a group of error bars or conﬁdence intervals. Other examples already mentioned are those
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of Marmolejo-Ramos and Matsunaga’s (2009) work on graphical techniques in exploratory data analysis and Balota and Yap’s
(2011) suggestions about “moving beyond the mean” in analysis
of reaction time curves. Readers are also pointed toward Landau’s
(2002) introduction to survival curves, which allow for the mapping of relationships between variables and outcomes over time in
a simple but clear manner.
Rather than focusing purely on the question of whether a difference exists, our aim should be to use statistics to illustrate and
characterize the range of measurements recorded as fully as possible. By using the range of quantitative options available more
fully (range, median, variance, and others) we can provide a better
qualitative appreciation of the behaviors we observe, a richer and
more nuanced picture of the phenomena that we are interested
in describing, explaining and predicting. This will also allow our
predictions to become much more interesting – not just whether
one group will be bigger or faster or more but what the range or
distribution of outcomes are likely to be depending on the size of
the sample or its composition. Further, we could examine whether
there are differences on a range of variables (e.g., working memory capacity, IQ, reading speed) between people who do and do
not show the average target effect. This will provide us with a
richer data source that may reveal more about why some people
exhibit the effect and others do not, and this would expose more
information about the mechanism under scrutiny.
We would also do well to expand the set of tools available to us.
The history of psychology is rich in alternate methods of analyzing
behavior that do not rely on averaging group data. Research in
psychophysics regularly analyses data from individual subjects;
neuropsychology has a long history of single case studies; Piaget’s
theories were developed on the basis of analyses of the behavior of
a few subjects. In cognitive psychology, however, although there
are many researchers who ﬁt mathematical models to individual
data (Lewandowsky and Farrell, 2011), the modal behavior is to
focus on grouped data and average performance (see Table 2).
Lewandowsky and Farrell, 2011 (p. 106) suggest
that it may be advisable to ﬁt one’s models to both individual data and
aggregate data; if both yield the same result, one can have increased
conﬁdence in the outcome. If they diverge, one ought to rely on the ﬁt to
individuals rather than the aggregate.

With such data, dynamical and complex systems thinking offers
rich possibilities for alternate modes of investigation, as does
Bayesian analysis. Of course, these new instruments would not
exempt us from our role as sensitive, judicious and critical tool
users any more than would our more widely practiced and familiar
analytical techniques.
The mean’s many roles should be clear in our minds as we
design and conduct our experiments, as we take measurements,
and carry out analyses. Interpretations of the results should be
limited accordingly. Such critical consideration of the mean may
prompt us to broaden our methodological horizons, balancing a
sensitivity to the potentially universal and broadly shared with the
unique, the variable and the idiosyncratic. Ultimately, we should
be mindful of the purposes for which we are using the mean and
more importantly, the things we are trying to reﬂect by using the
mean. We should consider the degree to which we can assume
that the people from whom we take measurements and calculate
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average scores all possess a similar cognitive mechanism that
underlies the performance we have measured. If we think there
is likely to be a high degree of similarity in mechanisms, then
reﬂecting that performance with a mean is justiﬁed. Otherwise,
the mean will severely obscure variations in performance and
hence the variety of cognitive mechanisms possessed by people.

Finally, as researchers, we should deliberate over whether we are
making the assumptions about the mean that have been highlighted here. If these assumptions are implicit in our methodology,
then we should consider whether each is justiﬁable in our particular research context. If they are not justiﬁable, then alternate tools
may be necessary.
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